



The President, Vice President, and Secretary of Defense at Pentagon

1<sup>st</sup> Combat Camera Squadron (James M. Bowman)

# Beyond Goldwater–Nichols

## New Proposals for Defense Reform

By CLARK A. MURDOCK and RICHARD W. WEITZ

**O**n March 18, 2004, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report*. This

event culminated almost 2 years of effort at CSIS, which began by developing an approach for both revisiting the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and for addressing issues that were beyond

the scope of that landmark legislation. The project was officially launched in November 2002. When a CSIS team briefed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top advisers on January 10, 2003, the Secretary urged CSIS to accelerate its efforts so the results would be available for the 2004 legislative cycle. In response, the center decided to address its issue agenda in two tranches, planning initially to release a Phase 1 report in February that both analyzed and made recommendations on a smaller set of issues, with a Phase 2 report to follow in December 2003.

Congressional interest in defense reform grew as a result of the Bush administration's last-minute (that is, shortly before the House and Senate voted on the defense authorization bill) submission of its proposals for changes in the military and civilian military personnel system. Although the provisions affecting military personnel were stripped from the authorization bill, the House version, which was largely accepted by the Senate during conference negotiations in the fall, substantially revamped the civilian personnel system. Congressional appropriators, however, decided that defense reform issues warranted additional attention and provided \$1 million in the fiscal year 2004 defense appropriations bill to support further work. This enabled CSIS to address a much broader range of issues during its Phase 2 effort, which will end with the release of its report. This article summarizes the Phase 1 report and outlines the Phase 2 agenda.

### The CSIS Approach to Defense Reform

Acutely aware of the risks associated with making changes to organizational structures and processes, the Beyond Goldwater–Nichols study team employed a problem-centric approach to defense reform. It would recommend organizational or process changes only if the problems appeared sufficiently important to warrant the risks of unintended consequences.

**Clark A. Murdock is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Richard W. Weitz is associate director of the Center for Future Security Studies at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Beyond Goldwater–Nichols study team.**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>2005</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 260 Fifth Ave SW (BG 64) Fort Lesley J McNair, Washington, DC, 20319</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>8</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” was the first operating assumption.

For example, Goldwater–Nichols sought improved military effectiveness through greater jointness in the planning and conduct of military operations. Although one can identify insufficient jointness in how the U.S. military has planned (such as Operation *Anaconda* in Operation *Enduring Freedom*), it routinely conducts awesomely effective operations, making additional defense reforms unnecessary in this area. On the other hand, the

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unity of effort that Goldwater–Nichols brought to the planning and conduct of military operations has not characterized U.S. interagency operations. As illustrated most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, that problem is sufficiently severe to warrant accepting the risks associated with organizational change.

To enhance its understanding of these complex issues, the Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team relied heavily on the experiences of former practitioners to both identify problems and develop pragmatic recommendations. In particular, team members chaired multiple meetings of 5 working groups consisting of 120 former civilian and military officials who held senior positions in the national security apparatus. The team also drew on interviews, case studies, and real-life lessons learned. The initial drafts, findings, and recommendations were extensively vetted throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). John Hamre, President of CSIS, also hosted three “murder board” sessions of high-level former officials to review the Phase 1 results. Recommendations were arrived at not deductively from some ideal organizational end-state, but inductively from the collective experience of participants. The team developed experience-grounded solutions to clearly identified problems.

Although initially focused solely on defense reform, the CSIS approach soon looked beyond the scope of the original Goldwater–Nichols Act as it addressed national security issues that concern the entire U.S. Government, not just DOD. As we now see in both Afghanistan and Iraq, ultimate success requires that effective post-conflict “stability operations” ensue from victorious “major combat operations.” Defense reform must look beyond purely defense issues because, in many instances, ultimate success hinges on how well DOD integrates with other government agencies and coalition partners. During its initial preparatory stages, the Beyond

Goldwater–Nichols team identified lack of unity in strategy development, planning, and the conduct of interagency operations, as well as the increasingly difficult relationship between Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as two of the most vexing problems for DOD. Thus, it adopted the title *Beyond Goldwater–Nichols* rather than *Goldwater–Nichols Revisited* or *Goldwater–Nichols II*.

The team’s final operating assumption was its belief in the necessity of building capability to ensure that any individual or organization given new roles or responsibilities can execute them. Recommending that an institution, with its current structure and capabilities, assume expanded responsibilities in a new process is an empty mandate. Telling people to improve or change without providing the means and resources consistent with their new responsibilities typically leads to inaction, ineffectiveness, and failure.

In its approach to defense reform, the Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team has employed six guiding principles to shape its analysis. The first core principle is that preserving civilian control over the military represents a paramount value in the American political system and a prime responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. Since the es-

tablishment of DOD in 1949, the President has relied on the Secretary—who has absolute authority, subject to the consent of the President, over the department—to ensure the execution of laws, congressional mandates, and Presidential priorities in the area of defense policy. Over time, the Secretary has turned increasingly to his Under Secretaries as the principal means for exercising control of the military. The Service Secretaries, however, continue to assist in providing direction to the department.

The team’s second guiding principle is the need to maintain the institutional vitality of the military services. It is they who build and sustain the profession of arms in their respective mediums of warfare—that is, the body of expert knowledge and the men and women trained in the application of that knowledge to new circumstances. Identifying with the services also motivates young men and women to withstand the rigors of combat. In the words of Major General Tom Wilkerson, USMC, “I didn’t sign up to be a ‘DOD-er.’ I wanted to be a Marine.” As force providers to the combatant commands, the services are charged with formulating coherent budgets that balance the near-term demand of current operations with the need to invest in future capabilities.

The third principle guiding the team’s approach is that extending jointness in some areas will produce superior military, interagency, and coalition operations. Jointness, however, is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving improvements in areas of importance to national security. For example, the increasingly seamless use of forces in the field makes the lack of integration in how the services equip their forces less acceptable. As seen most recently in *Iraqi Freedom*, interoperability problems continue to plague tactical communications and contribute to friendly fire casualties. In an effort to overcome such problems, DOD has already restructured some functions, such as Special Forces and

missile defense, as integrated Department-wide programs. Extending notions of jointness to the interagency and coalition levels could also improve performance in these dimensions.

The fourth guiding principle is that defense resources should continue to be organized, managed, and budgeted along service lines. Goldwater-Nichols has helped enable the separate services to fight as a joint team. This success in enhancing jointness in the conduct of operations has led some to advocate additional jointness in how DOD organizes and prepares for warfare. The study team gave serious consideration to less service-centric approaches to managing resources, including the British Defence Ministry's reliance on joint capability managers to define requirements and a central procurement office for weapons acquisition. But the analysis showed that the services remain the single best source for coherent and integrated budgets

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within their respective domains. Therefore, the team does not advocate altering the basic organizational formula for how DOD allocates resources. Managing resources on a distributed basis, however, requires the continued development of coordinating structures to compensate for interservice seams.

The fifth guiding principle is that the combatant commanders, services, and defense agencies are the chief operating elements. The primary function of OSD is to supervise DOD management. The main responsibility of the Joint Staff is to oversee military operations. As a rule, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should not manage programs and the Joint Staff should not function as an operational general staff. As staffs supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary, OSD and the

Joint Staff should focus on policy formulation, policy representation, and policy oversight. These represent essential responsibilities that no other DOD element can perform.

The sixth guiding principle is belief in the need to ensure a healthy competition of ideas on major issues among the combatant commanders, services, Joint Staff, and OSD. Each of these DOD elements can offer valuable perspectives. Having a diversity of views informs decisions by ensuring the surfacing of all key considerations. A balance must be struck, however, between processes that ensure a diversity of views on the most critical issues and processes that create too many competing power centers and unnecessary friction.

Pragmatism has defined the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team approach to defense reform. The team relied heavily on experience when identifying and analyzing problems. It desired to preserve civilian control and maintain the institutional vitality of the services while extending and broadening jointness where it makes sense. While the team wanted the best ideas to emerge from a healthy struggle between competing offices, it sought to limit that competition to major issues. Organizational reforms are rife with unintended consequences. Like the sagacity of the Hippocratic oath, the core precept has been to do no harm.

### **Rationalizing DOD Structures**

The current organizational structures of the military departments, the Joint Staff, and OSD too often produce unnecessary overlap. In addition, their sometimes oversized headquarters staffs promote a narrow focus on small issues and neglect of the big picture. Duplicative and excessive staffs also require wasteful coordination processes. The arduous drill of securing all the "chops" required to advance a proposal frustrates innovators because those supporting the status quo have so many opportunities to block or dilute suggested changes.

Focusing on the core roles and responsibilities of each principal DOD actor exposes those institutions that do not add sufficient value to outweigh these inefficiencies in process and structure. The team favors a targeted consolidation of organizational structures that preserves a diversity of ideas where warranted and strengthens civilian oversight without impeding independent military advice.

Fundamentally, all DOD elements should support the Secretary because he has ultimate responsibility for all actions of the department. By focusing on policy formulation, representation, and oversight, OSD serves the Secretary best. In the first role, the office conducts analyses, develops policy options, provides advice, and makes recommendations. It also represents the Secretary in the interagency process, before Congress and foreign governments, and with the general public. Finally, OSD oversees implementation of DOD policies and programs to ensure they are consistent with the Secretary's intent.

The office, of course, can perform other duties as the Secretary prescribes. Although OSD elements have managed programs on occasion (for example, environmental cleanup and nuclear threat reduction during the Clinton administration), their track record has been uneven. More importantly, managers of programs tend to become advocates. Program management compromises OSD's essential role in policy formulation, providing an independent source of advice to the Secretary. The office should renew its focus on policy formation and oversight and resist the temptation to manage programs, which is the proper province of the services. Its oversight should focus on what a particular program or activity is accomplishing rather than how it achieves those accomplishments.

The team also recommends consolidating all OSD housekeeping functions into one portfolio under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. Integrating the Washington Headquarters Service (currently a





U.S. Navy (Johnny Bivara)

and J-4 (Logistics) should be merged into integrated civilian and military offices under a military deputy who reports directly to its respective Under Secretary. J-7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development), whose responsibilities have migrated steadily to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), should be disbanded.

The most significant consolidation of staffs should occur at the level of the military departments. The Secretary of Defense relies primarily on OSD for the oversight function, not the now-duplicative service secretariats. The civilian secretariats and the military staffs found in each military department constitute virtual mirror images. The team recommends merging most of them into a single smaller staff that reports to both the Service Secretary and the Service Chief of Staff. Creating integrated staffs that pair the Assistant Secretaries of each department with a military deputy would reduce frictions from coordination mechanisms, make service positions more coherent, and provide clearer lines of accountability.

### Allocating Resources More Effectively

Many critics call the DOD resource allocation process “the Pentagon’s real wars.” Deciding who gets what, and then making that decision stick, may be the Secretary’s most formidable challenge. The Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team approach to achieving improvements in this area reflects the guiding principle that resources should be organized, managed, and budgeted along service lines. Adhering to this principle necessitates an elaborate structure to ensure that the services follow the Secretary’s policy directives and build a collective defense program that balances resources across the largest organization in the world. In addition, the Constitution grants Congress a fundamental role in allocation with respect to defense and other policy areas. Elaborate systems and methods have evolved within DOD to help secure congressional funding. Given

field operating agency) and the Executive Secretariat will give the Secretary greater control over OSD mechanics.

The search for potential consolidation of OSD and Joint Staff offices should begin with the role of CJCS as the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. Although the Secretary would welcome the Chairman’s advice on all DOD matters, it is not clear that he needs CJCS to have independent staff on every issue before the department. On some issues, the Secretary would be

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better served by having a consolidated staff of civilian and uniformed personnel that reports directly to him while keeping the Chairman informed. In particular, the team recommends integrating military and civilian staffs with respect to managerial functions

and retaining as separate organizations those Joint Staff directorates that fall most directly within the Chairman’s military purview.

The Armed Forces increasingly wage joint and interdependent combat operations. Yet Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* show that DOD still fails to acquire and field joint interoperable command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) capabilities. Therefore, the team recommends the merger of J-6 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers [C<sup>4</sup>]) with appropriate elements of the Defense Information Systems Agency into an independent joint task force (with budgetary and acquisition authority) for joint C<sup>2</sup>. An Under Secretary for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) would be appointed to provide oversight of this critical area by elevating the C<sup>3</sup> function to the Under Secretary level and combining it with Intelligence. For the personnel and logistics function, J-1 (Manpower and Personnel)

these strictures, any system for allocating defense resources is bound to be complicated and sometimes inefficient.

Nevertheless, DOD decisionmakers too often find it excessively difficult to make tough tradeoffs between services and across military functions. Budgeting decisions remain dominated by factors other than strategy and planning. Since the services prepare the budgets, their priorities rather than joint perspectives typically dominate the process. Allocating resources that invariably fail to meet all demands requires Herculean efforts by all involved to avert the perennial “train wreck” while preparing the President’s budget request to Congress. The entire process consumes so much time and resources that DOD leaders can pay little attention to strategic decisionmaking, policy implementation, and program execution.

The Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team appreciates the substantial effort

current DOD leaders have made to strengthen strategic direction and build joint capabilities in the resource allocation process. The changes already introduced show considerable promise, but additional steps are necessary. In particular, the team recommends strengthening the capacities of the combatant commands so that they secure greater influence. The commanders should play an essential part in defining their short-term capability gaps as well as their proposed solutions. In addition, the combatant commands with global functional responsibilities should enjoy a larger role in addressing longer-term capability requirements. Special Operations Command, Transportation Command, Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command all have service-like responsibilities and should act as advocates for the capabilities their successors will need 10 to 15 years in the future. Determining the capabilities for a par-

ticular mission requires experienced analysts. The combatant commanders need enhanced analytic staffs in their organic J–8s to compete in this arena, as well as enhanced representation in the Pentagon.

The team further favors strengthening the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The office should be capable of providing independent analysis to the Secretary on a wide range of strategic choices, thereby supplementing the options generated by the services and the Joint Staff. In particular, it should conduct an annual zero-based analysis of two to three joint capability areas, including rigorous risk assessments. The goal should be to identify shortfalls and develop decision alternatives for the Secretary.

The Secretary also needs a mechanism for determining how well current policy is being implemented or current programs are being executed. Accordingly, he should create an independent, continuous policy implementation and execution review process under an office linked directly to OSD. This office would assemble all the department’s authoritative and directive guidance and provide a single, unified statement of its strategies, policies, and programs. This process would establish a clear standard to which all DOD components could be held accountable.

### Strengthening Civilian Defense Professionals

Since the Cold War, DOD has had difficulty attracting and retaining talented career civil servants. The problem stems from private sector opportunities that often offer superior pay and fewer bureaucratic frustrations, complex and rigid government hiring and security clearance procedures that can take months, perceptions that the Government is a plodding bureaucracy where young talent lies fallow, and a changing labor market where few workers stick with a single employer throughout their careers. Although September 11 and the war on terror have increased interest in public ser-



The Chairman and Secretary of Defense briefing Pentagon press

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vice, Americans still confront a frustrating government hiring process. Those who do become civil servants often complain of encrusted systems, needless hierarchy, and few opportunities for advancement to senior positions.

An explicit goal and notable success of the Goldwater–Nichols Act was to create incentives for the military's best and brightest to seek joint service, joint training, and joint education. Unfortunately, no parallel set of incentives or requirements exists to encourage professional development for DOD civilians or to broaden their experience base and skill set through education, training, or interdepartmental and interagency rotations. Whereas the military personnel system strategically marshals, manages, and maintains quality officers because it views its people as assets whose value can be enhanced through investment, the civilian human resources systems of the national security agencies do not follow this precept. They seem to

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lack an appreciation of the deep expertise, institutional memory, continuity across administrations, and seasoned perspectives on policies and programs their civilian professionals provide.

In the face of the coming retirement bow wave and current poor retention rates for young professionals, DOD leaders need to rethink and reform how the department manages its career civilians. Congress's enactment of the National Security Personnel System gives the Secretary significantly broader latitude to reshape the civilian workforce. He should use these powers, but he must take additional measures to attract, retain, motivate, and reward people.

The Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team recommends that Congress establish a new Defense Professional Corps to attract the best and brightest

civilians to DOD and to expand opportunities for professional development and career advancement. Like the Foreign Service, the Corps would have a competitive entry process designed to identify and entice talented people considering government service. Although most would join the Corps at the entry level, the system should allow mid-career professionals with valuable skills and experience outside government to join. Requirements for advancement should be designed to develop civilian leaders capable of operating effectively not only within DOD but also in the interagency context. Training, education, and interagency rotations for senior-level civil servants should become centerpieces of the new personnel system.

Like their military counterparts, DOD career civilians should receive the resources to enable them to undertake a sustained program of professional development. Congress allows the military services 10 to 15 percent additional end strength to create a personnel "float" that provides officers with opportunities for training, education, and joint rotations. A similar approach is needed for civilian personnel in OSD and the defense agencies to enable them to meet the professional development requirements of the new Defense Professional Corps. Congress should also reassess overly restrictive ethics rules to make it easier for defense professionals to move in and out of government. The Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team also advocates limiting the number of political appointees in DOD to enhance the incentives associated with career service.

### **Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations**

The past decade of U.S. experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia to Iraq, has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the Armed Forces

but also from across the Government and its foreign partners. In most cases, however, such unity has proven elusive, sometimes with disastrous results. The United States and its international partners have repeatedly failed to integrate fully the political, military, economic, humanitarian, and other dimensions of a given operation into a coherent strategy.

Goldwater–Nichols did not address the organization and functions of the National Security Council (NSC). The council needs to play a greater role in coordinating policy planning and overseeing policy execution with regard to regional crises. An enhanced role would help counter agency parochialism, identify potential disconnects and synergies, and elevate contentious issues to the deputies and principals for decision. The President should assign the NSC Deputy Assistant to the President lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans and for ensuring greater unity of execution among agencies. He should also establish a new NSC office to review and integrate agency plans for complex operations, help close gaps between them, and monitor their implementation.

Shortly after assuming office, moreover, each President should review the guidance establishing standard operating procedures for planning complex operations. This guidance should articulate an interagency division of labor by specifying which agencies should lead or support others with various tasks, define the mechanisms and processes used to integrate interagency planning, and provide a standard planning paradigm. Each administration should build on the lessons learned and best practices of its predecessor.

Weaknesses in other Federal agencies have forced DOD to bear the main burden of nationbuilding. Enhancing civilian capacities for conducting complex contingency operations is imperative. The Beyond Goldwater–Nichols team recommends that all agencies likely to become involved in complex



operations abroad (for example, State, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice) establish small offices to lead development of agency plans and participate in the interagency planning process. For each contingency operation, the President should designate one senior official to take charge of and be accountable for integrating U.S. interagency operations on the ground.

Congress should establish a new Agency for Stability Operations, with a Civilian Stability Operations Corps and Reserve, that would prepare for stability operations; organize, train, and equip civilian capabilities for such operations; and have the capacity to rapidly deploy civilian specialists to the field. The team further recommends creating a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would be run jointly by DOD's National Defense University and the State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

The team urges Congress to increase funding for programs that expand opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with their foreign counterparts. Such contacts and exchanges provide critical insights into partner approaches and capacities re-

### **the defense authorizing committees have less stature and influence than at any time in recent memory**

garding complex operations. They also help develop standard operating procedures for international contingency planning and coordination. Congress should also provide additional resources for programs that enhance the operational capabilities of allies and partners regarding complex operations. Americans benefit from improvements in the ability of allies and potential coalition partners to contribute to operations, especially in areas where the United States does not have a comparative advantage or lacks essential resources.

### **Strengthening Congressional Oversight**

Defense reform will occur only if members of the executive branch and Congress can agree on a set of recommendations and work together to achieve them. Unfortunately, congressional oversight of the defense establishment is languishing. Members of Congress engage in too few debates on major national security challenges and spend too much time on minor and parochial issues. The defense authorizing committees today have less stature and influence than at any time in recent memory. This decline in congressional oversight has contributed to deteriorating relations between Congress and OSD. It also deprives DOD leaders of the considerable benefits they would receive from a serious questioning of their plans, policies, and programs by members and their staffs.

The team offers the following proposals as suggestions, not recommendations, because only Congress can reform itself. The study team believes that congressional oversight would improve if the Armed Services committees focused more on "macro" strategy, policy, and organizational issues. Reducing the size of these authorizing committees and limiting claims of jurisdiction from other committees should also be considered. Also, it could prove profitable to experiment again with a 2-year authorization bill. Finally, members might consider following a procedure similar to that used for the base realignment and closure process and establish an independent group (perhaps of former congressional leaders from both Houses and parties) to recommend changes in committee memberships, structures, and jurisdictions that would enhance oversight.

### **Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2**

CSIS formally launched its Phase 2 effort in early May 2004 when the administrative arrangements for accessing its congressional funding were com-

pleted. To address the broader agenda of issues, CSIS expanded its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team to incorporate additional expertise and formed seven working groups of former officials. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols working groups held scoping sessions in June and July 2004 to review how the study team defined the problem and its work plans for addressing them.

The first three working groups are closely interrelated. Working Group 1 identified the U.S. Government capabilities needed for its most pressing 21<sup>st</sup>-century missions: homeland security, stability operations, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation/WMD elimination. Once these national capabilities were determined, CSIS made recommendations on assigning roles and responsibilities. Working Group 2 addressed unified command plan issues (for example, the role of regional combatant commanders in an era of global missions and global force managements), as well as the interface between the military command structure and the Federal Government approach to conducting foreign and domestic operations. This latter issue is closely linked to the agenda of Working Group 3, which focused on improving the ability of the NSC structure and processes to plan and conduct interagency operations.

During vetting of the Phase 1 draft recommendations, the most common reaction to those pertaining to the interagency process was, "Good recommendations, but you need to do more." Working Group 3 built on the Phase 1 work, including a more unconstrained look at the structure established by the 1947 National Security Act. The recommendations emerging from Groups 2 and 3, in turn, were assessed for how they affect the ability of the Government to perform the missions being examined in Group 1. Because of the close interplay among these three working groups, participants were invited to all meetings.

In the belief that decades of acquisition reform have failed to build a



responsive, efficient acquisition process, Working Group 4 attempted to design a new process. Group 5 provided a zero-based assessment of five commercial-like defense agencies (for example, the Defense Logistics Agency). Although subject to internal controls, the defense agencies, unlike OSD, the Joint Staff, or the military services, are rarely subject to external review. In response to strong congressional interest, Working Group 6 assessed the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols provisions on joint officer management and joint professional military education. It also took a "blue sky" look at more fundamental issues such as the role of education in an era when jointness is being pushed down to the tactical level. Finally, Working Group 7 addressed whether DOD is appropriately organized for operations in the domain of space and cyberspace.

Even as CSIS launched its Phase 2 effort, it closely monitored the implementation of its Phase 1 recommendations. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team was pleased with the attention being paid to defense reform by the senior leadership of the Pentagon. Despite an extremely crowded policy agenda, senior civilian and military leaders, including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs themselves, and the Service Secretaries made time to review CSIS findings and provide feedback. Both OSD and the Joint Staff are actively considering which recommendations the Secretary and Chairman could implement together and which the Secretary could implement on his own authority. The study team believes that the senior leadership in DOD, both civilian and military, is clearly receptive to defense reform and is deeply grateful for the opportunity to serve in that cause.

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The report on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 was scheduled to be available through the CSIS Web page: <http://www.csis.org> in mid-2005.

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## Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition



For nearly a quarter of a century, the Chairman has challenged students at the Nation's professional military education institutions to think and write creatively about national security issues. The best from across the military services and Federal Government spectrum compete for recognition of their efforts in The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition.

The 24<sup>th</sup> competition was conducted by NDU Press with generous support by NDU Foundation on May 18–19 at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

Judges from participating senior-level schools selected the "best of the best" to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The winning essays will be featured in the upcoming issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 39, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2005.

### Be Part of the Silver Anniversary

The 2005–2006 academic year is approaching. It is not too early to begin preparing for the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the CJCS Strategy Essay Competition in Spring 2006. Look for updates on rules, eligibility, and awards for this special event on the pages of *Joint Force Quarterly* or visit the NDU Press Web site: [www.ndu.edu/inss/nduphp.html](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduphp.html)

1<sup>st</sup>

#### Al Qaeda as Insurgency

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, USMC  
U.S. Army War College

2<sup>d</sup>

#### A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process

Martin J. Gorman, Defense Intelligence Agency,  
and Commander Alexander Krongard, USN  
National War College

3<sup>d</sup>

#### Guantanamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror

Colonel Gerard P. Fogarty, Australian Army  
U.S. Army War College

#### America's Strategic Imperative: A National Energy Policy Manhattan Project

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Amidon, USAF  
Air War College